The four pillars of Serbian foreign politics – EU, US, Russia and China present a good concept, both pragmatically and profitably. However, there is a risk of being caught into an empty rhetoric used when needed, separately instead of comprehensively, more commercially than politically, more tactically than strategically.
If we disregard the obvious exaggeration in the concept of Serbia as a country that has strategic contracts with the world’s largest forces, the practice can tell us that this concept was based on court-annexed rule. The way in which this four pillars are divided – two in West, two in East, makes them a more suitable protection that Belgrade is looking for when things are not going well at one end, than an equally balanced alliances that could function without threatening each other.
This concept is called “the completion of Serbian foreign policy doctrine”. Bellow is a brief overview of the Serbian relations with for pillars of its diplomacy.
European Union: Since 2001. EU has donated 3,6 billion dollars in grant money to Serbia. The total of 57% of Serbian products is exported into EU countries. The positive opinion of European Commission and the expectation to be granted a status of a candidate on December 9th are successful end of a stage that has been a hostage of Hague obligations for a long time. By setting the date for the beginning of negotiations, EU got clearly involved in the settlement of relations between Serbia and Kosovo and in releasing the north of Kosovo under the control of authorities in Pristina (the autonomy and its degree can be subject of negotiations). Belgrade’s attitude of persisting in the current politics towards Kosovo significantly affects the future perspectives of faster integration of Serbia into EU.
US: Second on the list of individual countries with 810 million dollars donation to Serbia since 2011. The plain cooperation based on the formula “we agree to disagree” (again related to Kosovo). The best cooperation was achieved within the military sector, although the current Serbian government unilaterally resigned from the Atlantic integrations.
Russia: The trade in the amount of four billion dollars. Number six among Serbian export partners, and number one in import (energy). The closest and the loudest ally in regards to Kosovo which led to “particularly close relations” (Tadic). The support is solely political, as there is no economic aid.
China: The trade in the last year reached the amount of 1,3 billion Euro. Low level of investments in Serbia. The furthest immediate ally regarding Kosovo.
As democratic changes in 2000. had the aim of Euro-Atlantic Integration (EU and US), the subsequent expansion of the alliance could be interpreted as a rational need of multilateral world, but behind the scenes was hidden the most expensive Serbian word – Kosovo, even more present than any economic or other interests.
The close relations with Moscow and Beijing can be used as a warning to Brussels and Washington that Serbia can take the opposite direction. So, despite the phrase that “EU has no alternative”, the quest for strategic partners in East is sending the message to the partners in West: Serbia can have an alternative.
Time has shown that the deviations from the strategic line of joining EU and from the values of its politics and democracy are not a coincidence. They always serve in a function of Kosovo. It makes sense that Serbia, facing the internationalized issue of Kosovo, is building the great part of its internal politics on the ground of its foreign policy. However, in practice, the tables are turned.
The four pillars of Serbian democracy are based on the politics: “Both Kosovo and European Union”. We need US and EU for the sake of Euro-integration, and Russia and China because of the defense of Kosovo. In addition, the concessions to allies have been made secretly without the clear explanation why. This kind of relation not only causes revolts in the West, but cannot lead to gaining any trust in the East.
This type of occasionally cheap and profit-making orientation reveals all the strategic weaknesses of Serbian foreign policy, and not only within these four pillars. How much time and how many chances have been lost in estimation that Serbia will divide EU over the question of Kosovo and, by doing that, secure its position?
This game can make results only for a short period of time. It is useless in the long run because the Union will certainly not fall apart or split over the different approaches to the question of Kosovo. Especially since Serbian allies within EU are more encouraged by their own fears of separation than by the true commitment to Belgrade.
If Serbia has indeed defined European Union as its strategic priority, as it insists on claiming, then it has to start adopting its foreign politics to EU even before becoming the member country. The aims had to be clear and lead to graduate integration into the Union’s politics towards Russia and China.
Since not being a member of EU, Belgrade has been exempted from obligation of the collective foreign politics. As a consequence, Belgrade has already made several moves highly conflicting with the concepts and principles of EU foreign politics. Of course, this could not have been formally disapproved in Brussels, but it certainly has been recorded. Let’s remember the Iran resolution, Gruzia, the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010.
Because of its inconsistency and crooked moves, Serbian diplomacy cannot count on serious allies, and has pretentiously believed that it can cover the whole world with “four pillars”. As London “Economist” have sarcastically described: that was the case of “diplomacy on steroids”.
Wandering between the pillars made Serbia bounce like a balloon and caused the intolerable level of improvisation which is the mother of inconsistency.
Let’s remember the requests Hague Tribunal was facing when reaching an opinion on the subject of Kosovo’s independence. Belgrade made pressures everywhere, it managed to slow down the process of recognition of the authorities in Pristina and even brought this question up to the Hague Tribunal. Since the reached opinion did not question Kosovo’s independence, Serbian diplomatic body disregarded it and exempted it from the rhetoric.
Ignoring the facts became a practice. In June 2010. The British Ambassador has said the same thing that German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated completely accurately in August 2011: the European integration of Serbia and Kosovo are not two separate paths and if Belgrade wants to become a candidate and to set up the date for the negotiation it has to practically assist the disintegration of parallel structures in the North of Kosovo.
The western partners do not want to tolerate the rhetoric “Both Kosovo and Europe” any longer since it has been made clear that Belgrade faced the choice “Either Kosovo or Europe”. This has lead Serbian diplomacy in the Kosovo deadlock. The concept of “four pillars” is on a serious trial.
Despite the positive opinions on the candidacy, bearing in mind the conditions Belgrade has to fulfill in order to set up the date for negotiations and the possibility of not achieving these conditions, there is a threat for Serbian diplomacy to get isolated from both EU and US and be put aside Russia and China where it has never been a foreign policy priority.
Serbia – the country in a draft
We still haven’t heard what the authorities consider as truly possible