Year ago in your interview for Novi magazin you said that the problem in Serbia is not so much lithium mining as citizens’ lack of trust in the government. Do you still think that?
Two years ago in my last interview, I said that Rio Tinto’s project had become an issue reflecting political tensions and polarization in Serbia, and that as a result, the conversation had shifted away from discussing the technical, geological, technological characteristics and potential impacts of the project itself. I found that very few facts about the extractive conditions were discussed during my interviews with various people. As a result, little room was left to have constructive and decisive conversations over whether or not the project is a good idea, on what basis, and whether and how it could benefit Serbia.
When I conducted interviews as part of my research, I remember various issues, concerns and anxieties being raised. They were quite diverse. There were understandably issues about the differences in terms of land use, attachment to the land itself, and visions about life in the Jadar region. There were issues around expectations over how a mining actor should be allowed to operate, which tacitly meant raising concerns about the way in which the Serbian state decides on land use and resource extraction. There were concerns about the environmental impacts, pollution, human health etc. There were concerns as well about the perceived or real lack of transparent strategy on the part of Rio Tinto to engage with communities in Jadar, and anxieties about how Rio Tinto may produce egregious damage of the likes seen in Australia with indigenous heritage. All of these concerns were about the Jadar project itself. It was not always clear if concerns were systematically based on facts during interviews, but these discussions pertained to what Rio Tinto would do, and how it would impact Jadar, its people, and its environment.
But the majority of the conversations I had were about other things: There were concerns about the potential multiplication of mining sites in the country as a whole; about potential expropriation measures; about the type of resource gain and redistribution methods agreed between the government and mining actors; about potential lack of transparency leading to corruption, and to political subversions in the Serbian system, which seems to be where there is a particular trust issue at play. There are also concerns about foreign influence coming from different directions, apparently crystallizing a feeling that Serbians do not own their future, and that they are not effectively exercising their right to self-determination. What was striking was that there was a tacit feeling that Serbia was trapped by the interests of other blocs, like the EU, the US or Russia, and that Serbians themselves were somehow sacrificed in the process.
These conversations show that Rio Tinto’s project crystallises concerns that go beyond the project itself, and which are the deeper issues at play shrouding conversations about the project, about if and how it should be allowed, and if so, under what circumstances, and finally about what future the project contributes to for Serbians and for Serbia. These conversations tell the story of broken trust between people and government, and also between communities and a private sector actor like Rio Tinto. So how do you go about addressing these inter-dependent, yet separate set of issues?
In your opinion how can be solved this problem? Can this problem be solved?
In a way, the issue about the Jadar project is two-fold: what will happen with the Jadar project, and what will happen as a result of the Jadar project (if it happens or do noes happen). If you want to “solve” the Jadar issue, my recommendation would be to have an independent, expert-informed multi-stakeholder dialogue process that helps to map out the issues of the project itself and the issues the project crystallizes. Beyond mapping out, the point of the process would be to open an evidence-informed space for discussion which leads to deliberation on the Jadar project itself, and on the issues that the project raises, including around transparency and trust between different stakeholders. An independent project like that would certainly help to achieve full deliberations on the project, but it could also open the way for much larger processes to happen for trust to be rebuilt within political-economic realms that go beyond the project. The process would have to involve the government, civil societies, political parties, media and obviously Rio Tinto. If you think about it this way, you realize that what the Rio Tinto project polarizes and protracts shows exactly what needs to change. What is missing is how to organize a process that facilitates collective and constructive conversation about various forms of change. That is what an independent, evidence-based and multi-stakeholder process could help to facilitate in terms of discussion and deliberations.
In your opinion, do Serbia will benefit from this lithium mining? And, what are the negative effects ( ecological issues) of lithium mining?
There is no question that Serbia could benefit from lithium mining from an economic perspective. The central question that I think you’re asking is how economic gains will be redistributed and whether they will serve the public good. To answer this question, one has to look into the way in which Serbian law determines taxes and royalties for a company like Rio Tinto; how transparent tax collection and redistribution will be, and whom/what region/ what sectors socio-economic redistribution will accrue to. It is also about how the project leads to economic diversification and technological investments along supply chains, which Serbia seems fairly positioned to do. These are precisely the types of topics that need to be explored on a fact-checked basis, and which can lead to discussions about the circumstances in which private sector actors are allowed to operate, and who gets to decide these circumstances with legitimacy.
On the negative effects of mining, the question is wider than it appears. Mining is obviously environmentally invasive. Generally, one has to look at water extraction effects, tailings management and potential pollution effects with mining. But here is the thing: each deposit is unique and requires its own technology. Mining in Serbia does not resemble lithium extraction in Chile. In the Jadar case, Rio Tinto seems to have developed one of the most technologically advanced mining project for underground mining, aiming to preserve the agricultural potential of the region. It is also investing means into developing technologies around tailings management that reduce leaking risks. In other words, Rio Tinto is demonstrably interested in the reduction of environmental impact as a way to improve its technological know-how in the first place, and also as a way to demonstrate environmental responsibility. This is information in and of itself. It will of course only limit damage, not erase it.
I do want to add an element that is not very often under consideration, and which the Jadar case illuminates quite nicely. Serbia is the most climate vulnerable country of the Western Balkans according to indexes such as Notre Dame Gain. The Jadar region and its agricultural base will increasingly suffer from climate disruption between floods and droughts, raising questions about the future of its regional adaptation. When Serbians discuss whether lithium extraction should be allowed, they should not just take into account the past as a reference point but also the future. For example, if models demonstrate that climate change will represent regular and dramatic flooding events within the next decades, what is the best adaptation strategy for agriculture? Can Serbia’s breadbasket even survive an increasingly dangerous climate trajectory? If not, how does that play out in people’s considerations and deliberations about lithium extraction? By the same token, if flooding events occurred regularly and dramatically in the next years and if lithium extraction was allowed, would mining operation be fit to resist the impacts of climate change, or would it lead to catastrophes? It is worth noting here that a company like Rio Tinto is legally obliged to test tailing management plans against climate projections, like all major companies based in the OECD space. This is also a fact that can help to inform discussions and deliberations.
These are the types of questions that a process like the one I mentioned earlier would need to raise. The Jadar project is one of these projects that would contribute to the mitigation against climate change. But just as importantly, it is about how Serbia lays the foundations of its future adaptation to climate change and to changing international security circumstances. Asking the question in this way highlights Serbia’s significance in world affairs, what issues Serbia faces about its own history and its own future, and how it navigates self-determination on the basis of facts and evidence, and collective intelligence.
Is there a danger that Serbia will become a colony, because of lithium mining, as the Serbian opposition claims? We have the example of Congo, which, due to its wealth of rare raw materials, has been the subject of various wars for years, led by various foreign interests.
I don’t think the notion of colonialism is helpful to discuss the potential implications of mining or extractives in today’s world, especially in a country like Serbia. Even in the DR Congo, while minerals have in some cases contributed to wars, especially in the East, conflict dynamics and drivers are much larger than extractives. Serbia is not experiencing conflict, it is much more territorially integrated than the DR Congo etc.
If we want to discuss the implications of mining and resource extraction in today’s world, it is important to identify where concerns may emerge. We are facing an important extractive wave in the next few decades to respond to the needs of a climate emergency that threatens all of us, regardless of nationality. This extractive wave is taking place in a world that remains powerfully globalized from an economic perspective, but increasingly fragmented from a geo-political one. Mineral-endowed countries like Serbia are the locus of more economic and geopolitical interests as a result of the energy transition, and of larger power dynamics between different blocs. That’s the global background. Let’s look at what is happening in the mining world. Within the OECD space, major companies like Rio Tinto are looking at various factors: how to best transform deposits into reserves (meaning, deposits that are economically viable to extract from due to their concentration levels, geological conditions, environmental characteristics and technological innovations) and how to minimize their investment risks as much as possible, which ideally requires stable and institutionally-endowed countries. A country like Serbia is considered as more interesting from an investment perspective precisely because there are institutions in place that are supposed to support the rule of law, because it demonstrates economic vibrancy, strong infrastructure etc. Seen in this light, the parallel with colonialism does not hold. In addition, it appears that the Rio Tinto project is leading to discussions about how to diversify economic sectors in Serbia to position it even further within the technological races of tomorrow, as opposed to reduce Serbia to resource extraction. Again, this is not consistent with the colonial parallel.
What Serbia seems to be more at risk of is one of fragmentation and paralysis, which once again highlights the need to have evidence- and fact-based conversations about the Rio Tinto project and what it crystallizes in terms of malaise.
Who should be responsible for preserving the natural environment in Serbia? Can the EU be a guarantor that the private company Rio Tinto will take care of the environment in Serbia?
The primary environmental steward in a national jurisdiction is the government. When the government allows a private sector actor like Rio Tinto to extract resources within the country, the first thing a company needs to abide by are national laws. They give the framework for a company to report against, to be verified against, and if damage happens, to be evaluated or judged against.
As a secondary layer, multi-national companies like Rio Tinto adhere to voluntary standards and to corporate commitments around Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Standards. Executives have to report to their board about environmental performance, which contributes to a company’s valuation on world markets. ESG standards are far from being perfect, but let’s recognize that they exist and that they are actively being discussed and translated into legal frameworks at the very least in the OECD space, which Rio Tinto originates from.
The EU is not a direct actor in extractives in Serbia. It cannot act as a guarantor since it is a sovereign responsibility of the Serbian government. However, the EU now has a strategic partnership with Serbia. This partnership serves as a basis for negotiations about critical minerals and supply chains. It is often used to discuss economic value addition where European actors may play a role, and, depending on the needs, regulation for environmental issues. If the type of process I mentioned earlier were implemented, and should Serbs want European involvement in environmental investments and monitoring, it is something that could be discussed within such a process, which could therefore involve European stakeholders.
Do you think that during last few years European Union made progress in having access to rare raw materials, which are necessary for the “green” agenda? Or EU is still late in the that process which can cause instability in EU?
Since the start of the war of aggression in Ukraine, the EU equipped itself with the critical raw materials act (CRMA) and with multiple strategic partnerships with external countries. The CRMA holds a target to increase mining activities within the EU by 10%, and processing by 40%. In addition, the EU has struck 13 strategic partnerships, including with Serbia. Other countries include countries like Chile, Australia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine etc. These are partnerships that help to implement what the EU calls raw materials diplomacy. They are essentially documents that create spaces for discussions and negotiations about how to active and strengthen supply chains that are necessary for the world’s economy to function, and for the energy transition to happen. It is still too early to produce tangible results in terms of diversification strategy, but it is going in the right direction. For the moment, the EU, much like other regions and countries in the world remain highly susceptible to disruptions over supply chains.
How many lithium mines should be opened in Europe? Do you expect that to happen? Especially when it comes to lithium mining in Germany.
The CRMA holds a target to increase mining within the EU by 10% within the next decade at least. Lithium projects have opened or re-opened in France, in the Rhine region between Germany and France, in Sweden, in Finland and there are discussions in Spain, in Czechia and in Portugal.
There is a general perception that citizens of the European union do not want mining in their backyard (NIMBY-ism). I think we should clarify that NIMBY-ism exists everywhere. But there is more and more of an understanding that mining needs to happen, and that there are diverse forms of mining (expanding already existing mining projects, opening new projects, doing urban mining, reprocessing old mining, recycling etc). As a European citizen, I can tell you that there have been more discussions about mining in the EU in the last two to three years, and that it is indeed leading to more projects.
In order to answer your question fully, I should add some more clarifying points for consideration. In Serbia, lithium and borate are geologically bundled in a solid form. In the Rhine region for example, lithium comes in the form of brine which will be extracted with geo-thermal technologies that go deep underground. The bring extraction project is a franco-german project. The technologies that are invested are not the same between the Rhine and Jadar because the deposits come in different form, and this is a key aspect to understand if we want to discuss “mining” today. No mine is the same, because no deposit is the same. Mining actors have to adapt their technological and industrial plans to each and every deposit. In Serbia, Rio Tinto has spent years of research during their exploration time to understand if and how to extract lithium. In the EU, exploration is ongoing in different countries. Some projects are moving from exploration to exploitation, like in France, but exploration remains more important today. It requires going deeper underground in a lot of cases since generally deposits for key materials are quite poor in quality. The reason I mention all of this is because there is a misperception that European citizens want to avoid extraction and displace it somewhere else, including in countries like Serbia. By extension it would imply that European citizens think of countries like Serbia as less than. I believe this is a misconception of the discussions that are going on within the European Union.
What is happening with rare raw materials in eastern Ukraine, which is the among the most resource-endowed countries in Europe?
The war is preventing substantive discussion on the future of deposits. First because it makes no sense to have discussions about investment projects during a time of active war. Second, because the future of certain regions in Ukraine hang in the balance, along with the future of the deposits.
And what about the Africa and rare raw materials? Is the silent war for rare raw materials is still going on in Africa? Who is wining- western countries, China or Russia?
Again, I want to make sure we use words that give a sense of the picture. There is a rivalry, being pursued by different normative, technical, financial, political means between different blocs. China is undoubtedly still the most powerful actor in terms of mining for rare earth and processing of various types of minerals. How China will use supply chains in the future and what for remain open questions, which will depend both on the Chinese Communist Party’s aims, and the general trade dynamics the CCP responds to within the wider economic system.
Critical minerals are essential for decarbonized, digitalized and defense supply chains for decades to come. They are therefore the locus of competition, and the locus of conversations about security (which translate into diversification of supply chains against several types of risks, not just political instrumentalization). In my own research, I have seen patterns of behaviour by some actors, like Russia, which suggest they use non-conventional means of competition like disinformation campaigns, policy influence, political and economic co-optation of elites in fragile countries, use of para-military actors like Wagner to secure deposits, and sometimes displacing of communities. In circumstances like this, Russia’s behavioural patterns on critical mineral supply chains can be seen as a larger pattern of malign behaviour. Russia effectively uses war to pursue its political means, and critical minerals feature importantly in their strategy. For other actors, we cannot talk of war over minerals per se. We can talk about rivalry and securitization, in which a lot of actors participate because their own energy and economic security depends on it.
With all of this in mind, let’s talk about the various regions of the world that receive interest as a result of their minerals resources. The regions that are more actively discussed are Argentina, Chile, Peru, Indonesia, DRC and the Lobito corridor and central Asia (particularly Kazakhstan). African countries like Zambia, Namibia, Rwanda are actively trying to position themselves within the re-organisation of supply chains so as to capture as many economic gains as possible. My personal worry in African contexts is for countries that are more fragile, and conflict affected, in which institutions, monitoring watchdogs, and economic predation is rife. I have seen in countries like the Central African Republic that minerals can become part of geo-politicized conflict dynamics, which create economic and adaptation traps for these countries in addition to creating violence.
As per your question on “winning”, let’s break it down. On the one hand, every single human has a stake in the race to expanding the responsible and ecologically-sensible supply base for critical minerals. They will make or break the energy transition which will define the future of climate security upon which humanity depends. On the other, the energy and digital transitions have become the means to a re-negotiation of power dynamics in the international system. Countries compete for the means of the fourth industrial revolution (energy and technological transitions) as much as for its outcomes. A lot hinges on critical minerals as well the industrial and technological processes that follow them. This is where the rivalry comes in, and it is producing risks within the international system: kinetic war, trade wars or impulses towards protectionism and resource nationalism, deployment of influence tactics of different kinds for geopolitical purposes, normative fractures etc. At the moment, China is factually well positioned in many critical supply chains, and will remain a key actor for years to come. Diversification, if it succeeds will take time to show results, which is not good news in terms of climate timeline. Countries like Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Chile, Mexico, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia are powerful powerbrokers in global supply chains. Serbia could be one powerbroker too in the future. Years to come will show if diversification strategies lead to a re-balancing of geo-economics and therefore of geo-politics. Hopefully, this re-balancing within geopolitical power systems will align with climate commitments, which is currently highly in question considering climate trajectories.