In any consideration of the situation in the Balkans, the country that is unavoidable in questions about the future of our peninsula is without any doubt Albania. From the isolationist policy of Enver Hoxha and the fall of communism to today, when it became a member of the Council of Europe and NATO, in the last three decades, Albania has traveled a painful path from Stalinism to a democracy that is slowly consolidating. Following this complex development of a country is difficult without good analyzes and texts that give a realistic picture of that historical process, from internal politics to relations with and with other countries. For now, there is only one complete book that, in this discourse, opened the eyes of the whole world to Albania: it is the work of Fred Abrahams, Contemporary Albania. From Dictatorship to Democracy in Europe, which, since it appeared nine years ago, has been translated into the most important languages, and in our country, it was also translated by Indira Funduk from English to Serbian and published by the Belgrade publishing house „Clio“.
Abrahams, whose biography states that he is a program director at Human Rights Watch, works to train future researchers in conflict zones around the world, and he himself spent two decades in areas characterized by political crisis and armed conflict. Above all, the Balkans and the Middle East. The work Contemporary Albania… was born from those experiences, because Abrahams lived in Albania from 1993–1994, and since then he has periodically returned to it. Thus, the book offers „a lively account of the history of dramatic changes in Albania, allowing insight into the most significant events, such as the last meetings of the Communist Politburo, the first student uprisings, the fall of the Communist regime, the outflow of refugees, the war in neighboring Kosovo, and Albania’s relationship with the United States.“ The work is again in the spotlight, not only of the world, but also of ours – America, which for a period of time turned a blind eye to the not at all favorable political situation in Albania, is now again facing the election of the president. Will the arrival of a new personality change anything in the attitude of the strongest country in the world towards Kosovo?
Fred Abrahams is coming to Belgrade this week, where he will meet with representatives of non-governmental organizations with whom he will discuss common experiences and ways to improve the situation in the world. In an interview conducted by email before his arrival, Fred Abrahams pointed out to the readers of „Novi Magazin“ the most important moments in the development of Albania, and in its transformation into a modern state.
You wrote the book based on personal experience. What did you find when you came to Albania, and what did you find when you left it?
When I first saw Albania, in 1993, the country was extremely poor, underdeveloped, and disoriented after years of extreme repression. But many people shared a common feeling: hope. They believed in a brighter future. They believed in the slogan of the anti-communist demonstrations – „Freedom, Democracy!“ – even if they did not know exactly what that meant.
Today, Albanians in Albania enjoy a higher quality of life. Albania is open to the world. But the optimism and hope have largely been replaced by cynicism, resignation, or a desire to emigrate. The day-to-day life is better for most people, no doubt, but their aspirations for a socially cohesive democracy are buried under the construction sites of a self-congratulatory elite.
Of all the communist countries, Albania went through the most radical change, from Stalinism to democracy. How do you rate that transition?
The changes to the political system are extreme, so one cannot observe the former structures of dominance, manipulation, and control from the Enver Hoxha time. The changes to the political culture, however, are less pronounced and one sees commonalities with the past; namely, patriarchy (despite the record number of women in government), dominance of one political party (thanks also to the failures of a weak opposition), and the concentration of power (camouflaged by doodles and colorful ties).
On paper, Albania has all the features of a functioning democracy. On the ground, barely a decision gets made without the artist-in-chief.
The controls today are not political. No one is arrested for speaking out. The controls today are economic. In that sense, the post-communist system has become far more sophisticated and insidious. What started as petty theft became blue collar crime, then white collar crime, and today we might call it pink collar crime because it’s confident of its invincibility.
The checks against this power are frail. Despite huge sums given by governments and foundations, Albania’s independent media and civil society are weak.
In the end, I don’t think this development should be a surprise. Albania left Stalinism without the supporting infrastructure that’s needed to build a democratic house. Despite the construction boom, those walls and pillars take time to build.
How do you rate Edi Rama – from his first mandate to the present?
Three features of Edi Rama’s rule stand out. One is how talented a politician he turned out to be, which many people did not predict. It wasn’t clear at the start that he’d be as serious and strategic as he’s turned out to be, now likely to win his fourth term.
The second is the demise of the opposition since he first became Prime Minister in 2013. The Democratic Party has splintered and crumbled, leaving the Socialists with a largely unencumbered path to rule. As problematic as the Democratic Party and Sali Berisha are, the absence of a credible opposition plays into Albania’s political traditions of dominant rule.
The third is how Rama inherited a dynamic in which the United States and EU states tolerate a strong leader in Albania, some say autocratic, with rampant corruption so long as that person abides by the rules. First and foremost, that means not stirring up trouble in Kosovo or North Macedonia, which Rama has largely done. His efforts to help broker a land-swap deal between Thaçi and Vučić were consistent with the then-Trump administration’s views. Beyond that, he remains a loyal friend by building a NATO airbase in Kuçova, welcoming Afghan refugees, and helping Italy manage migration (by skirting international law). This has been the Faustian deal since 1992, established with the help of US ambassador Chris Hill, who de facto ran the show at the US embassy in Tirana back then: play nice in the region and rule at home.
During the transition to capitalism, after the fall of communism, what was the main mistake in the internal politics of Albania?
I make this argument with hesitation because, at the end of the day, Albanians themselves are responsible for what happens in their country, but as a small country Albania is vulnerable to influences from outside. In particular, I think the United States made a crucial error from 1992, with the government of Sali Berisha, when they placed their faith in one person rather than in building institutions. Berisha was the most formidable politician of that time, as Chris Hill knows, but the country would have benefitted from more brakes on his power. He arrested journalists and then the opposition leader (Fatos Nano). Then he flagrantly stole the 1996 elections. Then he let the pyramid schemes grow. The early indiscretions were chances to say “no” and the failure to do that was interpreted as a green light.
Ironically and tragically, the collapse of the pyramid schemes in 1997 led to the massive regional instability that the US was trying to avoid.
Ponzi schemes were a political fraud, they were supported by Sali Berisha, and the opposition parties, you say, and Albanian society as a whole were happy to participate in the game because it helped many families to survive…
Responsibility for the massive Ponzi schemes rests firstly on the shoulders of Sali Berisha, and to this date he has not been held accountable for that, despite roughly 2,000 people losing their lives. The criminal charges against him now are for alleged corruption later on, as is his being blacklisted by the United States. However, it’s true that others did not want the good times to end. The opposition Socialists and others did not want to be the bearers of bad news when families were surviving on the schemes. The media was also silent, and also promoted the schemes. There was a societal collusion, a collective wink and nod.
In the end, the opposition and media’s silence was a short-term tactical decision over longer-term wisdom. The tragedy of 1997 cost many lives and set the country’s development back years, not to mention sparked armed conflict in Kosovo due to the proliferation of arms.
The newly established Kosovo Liberation Army experienced these changes as a historic opportunity. Weapons flowed across the Albanian border to Kosovo. Do you really believe that Western countries and America could not foresee this as a consequence of their hypocritical policy in Albania as well?
By that point, 1997, US policy had turned against Berisha. There are theories, which I wasn’t able to prove, that the US helped the pyramids to crash by cutting off the oil smuggling from Albania to Yugoslavia in violation of the UN embargo, which was a key source of the pyramid schemes’ funds. The US was ready to turn away and I don’t think they anticipated such a meltdown that would lead to the looting of military depots. US policy was still firmly behind Ibrahim Rugova and his non-violent resistance, and the last thing they wanted was a group of young, frustrated, and angry men in Kosovo, tired of being repressed and dehumanized, getting arms.
Speaking of which, what was the attitude of Albania at the time when that war broke out, and during it?
The differences between Albanians in Albania and Albanians in Kosovo are significant. The former lived with repression by their own, the latter with repression from others. But solidarity with Kosovo’s Albanians was always high, and especially so during the conflict in 1998–99. I traveled to Kukes during the refugee crisis and saw how people opened their homes, donated money, and volunteered their time. There was ethnic affiliation but also a lot of genuine humanitarian care.
You write about US policy towards Kosovo. Both currents were against the independence of Kosovo: „The CIA was for war, the State Department for negotiations.” What do you consider the turning point towards the policy of Kosovo’s independence?
The first key shift was away from Rugova and towards the KLA, which happened gradually. The Clinton administration eventually saw Milosevic as an unreliable partner so neared itself to the boys in the hills. One example is the Education Agreement in September 1996, when Rugova went to Belgrade and Milosevic failed to implement the deal.
The US was also put in an increasingly difficult position by the ongoing atrocities by Serbian forces in Kosovo, which caused public outrage. Three key markers of the conflict involved such violence against civilians: Likosane/Cirez/Prekaz in Feb/March 1998, Gornji Obrinje in September 1998, and Racak in February 1999.
But even then, even during Rambouillet, US policy was against independence, and that is why Thaçi did not want to sign. He believed that he’d be called a traitor for signing anything less than independence, so they took a break as he went back to check with commanders. Once the war ended, the context was different and support for independence became policy.
You arrived in Kosovo as a representative of the Human Rights Watch in 1998. Later, you testified about the murders in Gornji Obrinje, at the war crimes trial of Slobodan Milošević. What was the key thing you said then?
In late September 1998, Serbian forces were wrapping up an operation in Drenica near Gornji Obrinje. My friend Dejan Anastasijević wrote then, I think in „Vreme“, that they „slammed the door on the way out“. I will never forget arriving on the scene and seeing the bodies of women and children lying in the gully. I testified about that in the trial of Milosevic, and in the other two Serbian leadership trials, too.
That testimony was one of the few examples when I had first-hand evidence of apparent war crimes. Otherwise, my testimony in The Hague was largely about notification. Because we sent all of our Human Rights Watch reports to Milosevic and other top officials, and often sent them questions about our findings, they were informed about the alleged crimes. This is relevant for the principle of command responsibility because they knew or had reason to know about the alleged crimes but did nothing about them.
I also testified in the current case against Hashim Thaçi and other KLA leaders before the Special Court in The Hague, and that testimony also raised the issue of notification: informing them of our findings about apparent crimes. I still believe that Serbian and Yugoslav forces were responsible for the vast majority of violations, but the law applies to all and responsible KLA leaders should also be called to account, especially as many of the crimes occurred after the war, also against ethnic Albanians.
I also hope the Kosovo Special Court will increase pressure on the Serbian government to take justice for war crimes by its forces far more seriously.
On the other hand, you write: „It took many years for the smell of those bodies to fade away from me. The massacre also revealed a disturbing side of the KLA. In order to gain the attention and support of the West, the group needed sympathy, and civilian casualties benefited them. The KLA often attacked Serbian forces and then retreated through the countryside, exposing civilians to the danger of a response in the form of excessive aggression.“ What was crucial for the NATO bombing?
The KLA was an unknown underground group and they needed to gain trust and support from the West. They understood that they couldn’t overcome the superior Serbian forces on their own.
I never found evidence, and I reject the conspiracy theories, that they manufactured massacres for political gain. But I do believe, as I wrote in the book, that they understood the publicity benefits of civilian deaths. They also understood the brutality of many Serbian forces, who showed a brazen disregard for the laws of war. I saw this with my own eyes and I wish the Serbian politics, public and judiciary would grapple with this more: the serious war crimes committed in Kosovo for which far too few people have been held to account. So, to put it this way, the KLA poked the bear in anticipation of the predictably tragic results.
In June 2014, the EU accepted Albania’s request for candidate status. What kind of politician does Albania need to become a member of the EU?
First is to act responsibly in the region, helping to promote peaceful outcomes to long-standing disputes, first and foremost over Kosovo. Second is deeper democracy at home, a meaningful democracy with less power in the hands of few, more independence in the courts, and a media that’s willing to hold leaders to account. The absence of independent media in Albania is a major deficiency with most outlets controlled by businessmen with political ties.
Connected to that is a much deeper fight against corruption. The US has sanctioned Berisha and he faces criminal charges but a genuine anti-corruption effort will extend across party lines. As Jared Kushner and Ric Grenell know, Albania is rich in resources, but that wealth should be equitably shared.
Has your book been translated into Albanian and published in Albania?
Yes, it has been published in Albanian by Dudaj Press with wide media coverage. Until then, no one had strung together all the events and interviewed all the players, plus gathered the declassified US documents, which are now posted on the website (modern-albania.com). But I hope it is not the last word: more journalism and scholarship are needed.