Hungary is not entering a phase of re-composition from a blank slate. Since 2010, the Orbán government has progressively consolidated a set of levers of power: constitutional revision in 2011, increased control over public and private media through structures close to the government, transformation of the Constitutional Court, and the creation of economic networks linked to the state, particularly in construction, energy, and public procurement sectors. These elements do not disappear mechanically with an electoral change.
TEST FOR CENTRAL EUROPE AND BALKANS
This is why the Hungarian transition is being observed far beyond its borders, particularly in Central Europe and the Balkans. It acts as a political test for countries where institutional balances remain fragile, notably Serbia and Slovakia.
In Serbia, the Hungarian model has served as an implicit reference for a system already strongly centralised. President Aleksandar Vucic has, for several years, developed a strong concentration of executive power, significant control over national media, and a network of political influence structured around institutional and economic loyalties. In this context, Viktor Orbán has often been perceived as a political ally and an example of stable governance within the European Union despite his illiberal orientation.
In this perspective, a weakening of the Orbán model in Hungary could have an indirect effect in Serbia: it would not trigger an immediate institutional rupture, but it would reduce the symbolic legitimacy of a mode of governance based on the concentration of power. The argument that a centralised system can coexist durably with European norms would become less easily usable. This could reinforce internal tensions between pro-European forces and those in favour of a more assertive political sovereignty.
In Slovakia, the situation is different. The country experiences more regular political alternation, but remains marked by tensions between pro-European parties, nationalist forces, and populist currents. Prime Minister Robert Fico, who returned to power in 2023, has adopted certain critical positions towards European institutions, while maintaining the country’s anchoring in the European Union.
Hungary is often perceived there in an ambivalent way: as an example of political sovereignty for some segments of the national right, or as a warning about the possible drift of power concentration for liberal and pro-European forces.
In this context, the post- Orbán era could modify internal Slovak balances not through a direct effect, but by reorganising the political references used in public debate. Actors in favour of strengthening executive power would lose a neighbouring model they regularly cited, while their opponents could rely on the difficulties of the Hungarian transition to defend institutional checks and balances.
ENEMY FROM INSIDE
But at the heart of this regional sequence lies a more fundamental question: that of the very nature of change in Hungary. The experience of the past sixteen years shows that a political system can become deeply rooted in state structures, to the point of outlasting electoral alternations.
The reorganisation of the media landscape is one example. A large part of private media has been gradually taken over or aligned through acquisitions and concentrations favourable to the government. In the judicial field, successive reforms have altered the balance between institutions, while in the economy, certain strategic sectors have become closely linked to actors close to political power.
It is in this environment that the rise of Péter Magyar takes place. A former member of the inner circle of Fides, he has emerged in rupture with the system he long knew from the inside. His trajectory is atypical: he does not come from the traditional opposition, but from an internal dissent born at the very heart of the political apparatus.
His discourse is based on a frontal critique of the power mechanisms established under Orbán, in particular media control and the fusion between state institutions and political interests. He has called for a rapid renewal of the main institutions, including justice and central administrative structures, arguing that they no longer ensure an effective separation of powers.
In his public interventions, particularly during appearances in state media, he has adopted a tone of direct confrontation, denouncing what he describes as a locked and unbalanced political communication system. This strategy aims to embody a clear break with the institutional legacy of Fidesz.
However, this dynamic raises a central difficulty: the rapid transformation of such a structured system implies relying on institutions that remain largely shaped by the former power. Even with a strong parliamentary majority, the ability to reform the constitution, the administration, and economic networks will depend on the resistance of existing structures and the stability of political support over time.
At the regional level, Péter Magyar’s trajectory would also be closely observed. In Serbia, his potential rise to power would weaken the idea of a stable and durable illiberal model in Europe. This could undermine the rhetoric according to which strong concentration of power is compatible with a European trajectory. In Slovakia, his action would serve as a reference point in an already polarised debate between deeper European integration and political sovereignty. In both cases, his impact would be less institutional than symbolic, by modifying political frameworks of reference.
Thus, the post-Orbán era should not be understood solely as a national transition. It constitutes a moment of observation for an entire region where political balances remain fragile and governance models still under construction. Hungary thus becomes an involuntary political laboratory: that of a system attempting to transform itself without yet knowing whether it can truly escape its own logic.
*Author is a former member of UN senior staff